

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have the full text of the remarks of the Senator from Oregon printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the remarks were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

REMARKS OF SENATOR WAYNE MORSE, SANTA MONICA CIVIC AUDITORIUM, SANTA MONICA, CALIF., JUNE 12, 1965

Today, the American people and the world are being told that foreign policy must be left to the Chief Executive and his small handful of advisers because it is too complicated and too important for the American people to understand. The consensus on Vietnam sought today is not a consensus of our people, nor even of the community of nations; it is a consensus among the State Department, Defense Department, CIA, and White House staff. Once that is achieved, the questions from the Congress and the people are hushed up with rebukes suggesting that to ask where we are going in southeast Asia and how we are going to get there amounts to giving aid and comfort to an enemy.

Fifty-two years ago it was similarly unpatriotic to ask questions of Kaiser Wilhelm and Von Moltke, Poincare and Joffre, Aquilino and Lord Grey. To question national aims and the means employed to pursue them has, throughout modern history, been silenced as a service to an enemy, just as though all wisdom lay with those in office and none with those who must always pay for the achievement of national aims.

And what a river of blood those men caused to flow across Europe. We look back on the events of two World Wars and we wonder how the people who suffered such terrible misery could have allowed themselves to be propelled into World War I by leaders who today are remembered for their utter blindness and folly in thinking that any of their national aims could be achieved by resort to war and violence.

Yet the same ominous signs of an imposed and enforced national unity are being seen in America today. One of the popular exhibits flashed about by foreign policy officials of our Government is a collection of news broadcasts and published stories from Hanoi and Peking which express the belief of the Communists that America is weak and divided on its Asian policy as evidenced by teach-ins, by the votes in Congress against blank-check war, and by student disturbances and rallies. No doubt the reports of this meeting will be made in the Communist countries of Asia and cited as an indication that if the war lasts long enough, Americans, like the French before us, will tire of the struggle and give up. And there will be newspaper stories here that will try to convince the public that only Communists and promoters of Communist causes could do such a thing as to question the soundness of American foreign policy as handed down by the combined wisdom of the Defense Department, the State Department, the CIA, and the White House staff.

But what is the record of these people in southeast Asia? Their record is one of having been wrong not once but consistently over 11 years.

On July 8, 1954, the chief of the U.S. military aid mission in Vietnam, Gen. John O'Daniel, declared, and I quote:

"The war in Indochina can still be won without bring in one single American soldier to fight.

"The Vietnamese have ample manpower and even today outnumber the enemy by 100,000 with superior firepower at least in a conventional war. We are ready to assist them in training an

adequate national army for the security of their homeland."

We banked over \$2 billion on President Diem for this purpose. And 8 years later we consented to his assassination as a means of removing him because he was losing more and more of South Vietnam to the Vietcong.

In the last 4 years, the record of administration officials has been even worse. With each mission to South Vietnam, we were told by the Secretary of Defense or of State that one more increment of American funds, or helicopters, or advisers would be the one that would put the war effort over. We even heard the Nation's leading expert on Vietnam, Secretary of Defense McNamara, tell us a little over a year ago that 1965 was the year when the American military could come home from Vietnam. His chief announcements today take the form of revealing new assignments of units to Vietnam, the dispatching of more Navy vessels to Vietnam, and the increase in U.S. air raids in Vietnam.

Yet these are the men to whom Americans are told they must place complete, unquestioning, and uncritical confidence. I say that aside from every other objection to such a resignation from our duties as citizens, these people have been too wrong for too long to justify any confidence at all.

But I predict that they will continue to widen and expand this war unless the American people rise to stop them. The next move is not long off because the impact of the last expansion of the war is wearing off.

We are already being prepared through the press for another escalation. We are already reading that while the air raids on the North gave a great boost to the morale of the South, the "boost" is wearing off, and something more will be needed to bolster Saigon back up again.

In his prize-winning account of our adventure with Ngo Dinh Diem, David Halberstam wrote:

"In the spring and summer of 1962, the arrival of the American helicopters had given the faltering cause in Vietnam a booster shot. It had not altered the nature of the war or the enemy's techniques, but they were caught off guard by the new equipment and the increased firepower of the government troops."

But, he continues:

"A year after the American buildup of weaponry and personnel had reached its peak, it was clear that the government had lost the initiative, that the enemy had benefited more from the weapons than we had, that his capacity had increased more than the Army of South Vietnam in the past year, and that with the failure of the Government civil program the guerrillas' tactical position was also superior."

"The American buildup which had been prompted by a deteriorating situation in late 1961, had lost its edge and momentum; the Communists had learned to react, and thanks to the outposts the enemy had been able to use the Government as a supply store."

The raids on the North by American planes have gone through much the same pattern. Great rejuvenation was reported among the soldiers and politicians of the South. But Sunday (June 6) the New York Times tells us that "in the last 8 days the Vietcong guerrillas have dispelled almost all the optimism that the South Vietnamese Government had been promoting for 3 months. The Communist forces appear to have proved, if there were doubts, that the South Vietnamese Army fared well all spring only by default."

This time the American response has been to move American ground forces in to do the fighting, in addition to the bombing. Sixty thousand troops are now the legacy of Gen. O'Daniel's policy that 600 U.S. military

## THE NEED OF A NEW U.S. POLICY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, on June 12, at the Santa Monica Civic Auditorium in Santa Monica, Calif., the distinguished Senator from Oregon (Mr. Morse) delivered a brief but important address which he began by stating:

Today, the American people and the world are being told that our foreign policy must be left to the Chief Executive and his small handful of advisers because it is too complicated and too important for the American people to understand.

He goes on to say:

The consensus on Vietnam sought today is not a consensus of our people, nor even of the community of nations; it is a consensus among the State Department, Defense Department, CIA, and White House staff. Once that is achieved, the questions from the Congress and the people are hushed up with rebukes suggesting that to ask where we are going in southeast Asia and how we are going to get there amounts to giving aid and comfort to the enemy.

The Senator from Oregon goes on to point out how many of our leaders who have been guiding policy have been mistaken. He points out, for example, that on July 8, 1954, the chief of the U.S. military aid mission in Vietnam, Gen. John O'Daniel, declared:

The war in Indochina can still be won without bringing in one single American soldier to fight. The Vietnamese have ample manpower and even today outnumber the enemy by 100,000 with superior firepower at least in the ratio of 2 to 1, and probably more. And we are ready to assist them in training an adequate national army for the security of their homeland.

The Senator from Oregon goes on to mention more mistaken prophecies; for example, one by Secretary McNamara when he prophesied that in 1965 our military mission would be ended in South Vietnam and we would be withdrawing our troops.

Senator MORSE concludes by saying:

This is no longer an issue of whether an American protests against the war in Vietnam give aid or encouragement to the Vietcong. It is an issue of whether southeast Asia is going to be saved from war and communism by our present policy, and I say it is not. We are driving Asians by the millions into the arms of communism.

The Senator from Oregon concludes with this statement:

The American people must demand a new policy in Asia, not only one of legality and morality, but one of realism. We are ready to assist them in training an

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